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ABSTRACT 
This study examines whether investors overreact to 
bad news during good times (economic expansion) and 
under react to bad news during bad times (economic 
downturns). The study exammes the investors' 
overreactions and under reactions to bad news during 
business cycles. It is found that the immediate price 
reaction to a firms' profit warnmg (bad news) is much 
stronger during periods of economic expansion than during 
periods of economic contraction. Firms that issue bad news 
during good times are severely punished by investors as 
opposed to firms that release negative news during bad 
times. Furthermore, the size of the company and the sector 
in which it operates is a major factor in the reaction of these 
firms' price shares due to the issue of the profit warning. 
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CHAPTER I: 
INTRODUCTION 
The force and magnitude of profit warnings of firms are areas 
under discussion in many academic papers (Brown, 1978; Watts, 1978, 
Randleman et al. 1982; Jackson and Madura, 2003, Church and 
Donker, 2009). Jackson and Madura (2003) establish in their research 
an average negative abnormal return (CAAR) of 22 per cent during the 
time period of five days before and five days after profit warnings 
have been made public. Few other researchers also reached the same 
results (Church and Donker, 1999). Different results for the magnitude 
of the decline in stock price depends on the point in time of the study, 
and the physical location where the study took place (Kothari and 
Warner, 2003; Ahem, 2009). It has been defined that 'profit warnings' 
are a type of bad news and as such they provide imperative 'market' 
information for investors which is used to create and facilitate 
government policy (Beaver, 1988) as well as to test market efficiency 
(Firth, 1979). 
The rational expectation hypothesis has proved that the stock 
markets do react excessively to profit warnings ('bad news') in good 
(expansion) times and under react to bad news in bad (contraction) 
times (Veronesi,1999). Recent research in the context of U.S. firms 
has found that investors overreact during the upward phase of the 
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business cycle and under react during the downward phase of the 
business cycle (Adjit and Donker, 2011). This study further 
contributes to the literature by examining the nature and the extent of 
overreaction and under reaction of stock prices to the profit warnings 
of firms' size wise as well as industry wise differences of profit 
warning firms in the U.S. for the period 1995-2009. This study is 
primarily focused on how the different phases of the business cycles 
(expansion/contraction) influence the stock prices of those firms. 
The study is organized m the following order: Chapter II 
revtews the literature on the subject and presents the vanous 
hypotheses for empirical investigation. Chapter III discusses the data 
base and methodology of the study. Chapter IV presents the empirical 
results. Chapter V summarizes the conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER II: 
REVIEW OF THE LITRATURE 
Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984) established that in general there 
is substantial evidence that earnings information can affect firm value. 
Clare (2001) observed a general pattern of pre-warning negative 
abnormal returns using a sample profit warning in the UK in the late 
1990's. Profit warnings are related to revisions in earnings guidance in 
between normal dissemination of financial information and most often 
contain an element of market surprise (Morse, 1981; Rendleman, 
Jones, and Latane, 1982; and Bartov, 1992). Unlike earning 
announcements, which have a predetermined and recurring release 
date, profit warnings are not announced in advance, and as such, the 
component of surprise is larger, resulting in the subsequent sharp 
negative abnormal return of the price of shares. This leads to: 
HI: Issuing a profit warning leads to a negative abnormal return of 
stock prices of the issuing firm. 
A firm announces a profit warning if it has strong evidence that 
the market's perception about future earnings is unrealistic. Datta and 
Dhillon (1993) found that unexpected declines in firms' earnings bring 
forth a negative and considerable stock price response. They have 
determined that market valuation declines by about 2 per cent, on 
average, in reaction to unanticipated earning declines. They have 
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found that firms that issue profit warmngs expenence negative 
valuation effects at the time of the announcements. When the 
information is coming directly from the firm that is being valued, it is 
valid . The only remaining argument for a lack of response to profit 
warnings would be that the market already knows the information. 
Information leaks may have occurred, prompting management's desire 
for revaluation of the firm. Some information about the firm ' s profit 
may have been leaked to the public such as insiders informing analysts 
or institutional investors. 
Grossman and Hart (1980) illustrate that officers of firms have 
incentives to reveal all known information to obtain higher share 
prices since failure to do so would cause shareholders to assume the 
worst about the firm. Shareholders can rely on the information 
disclosed when there are contractual and legal obligations and 
penalties for non compliance as well as consequences for managerial 
reputation in the case of misreporting. 
Ajinkya and Gift (1984) and King et al. (1990) determined that 
managers desire, in general, to align investors' expectations with the 
forthcoming financial results, in order to avoid large stock price 
fluctuations, and to protect analysts from embarrassment. 
Nevertheless, there is a legal liability and thus a strong incentive for 
managers to warn investors of a large earning surprise. No warning in 
such cases may be construed as failure to correct or update the earlier 
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statement and provide proper disclosure. Bremer and Sweeney (1991) 
documented that large stock price reactions are often followed by 
abnormal price reversals in the following days. Therefore, if there is a 
large negative response to a profit warning, some investors may sense 
the overreaction and will attempt to capitalize on the discrepancy and 
thereby forcing a stock price reversal a situation that will prevent 
arbitrage. 
H2: The magnitude of profit warning impact (positive or negative) 
varies according to the phase of the business cycle (expansion or 
contraction). 
During the economic expansion periods, investors will become 
highly confident that the market is in good state. Under such 
circumstances, further good news has little impact on investors' 
expectations. Such positive news only confirms the current state of the 
economy. However, bad news causes market prices to fall, since bad 
news lowers the perception of investors that the market is in a good 
state. The uncertainty about the state of the economy causes 
asymmetry in the responses to bad news. Bad news during good times 
will cause further uncertainty and will negatively influence market 
prices. Conrad et al. (2002) suggest that there are systematic shifts in 
the investors' sentiment that are common across stocks: specifically, 
during good times, investor confidence rises and investors extrapolate 
good news for firms. Although there are many studies on the impact of 
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profit warnings as well as other events on share prices, there are very 
limited studies on the impact of profit warnings on its peers (non-
announcing firms) in the industry and across borders, and whether 
such impacts are also symmetrical across business cycles. 
Jackson and Madura (2007) find that the market response to 
profit warnings is significantly less negative since the inception of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD), implemented by the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) on October 23, 2000. Barberis et al. 
( 1998) argue that after a series of announcements of good news, 
investors become overly optimistic that future news announcements 
will also be good and hence overreact, sending the stock price to 
excessively high levels. During times of bad news managers might try 
to conceal bad news: Libby and Tan (1999) argue that investors 
penalize firms for not warning them, lose confidence in management 
that does not communicate, and firms that do not communicate news 
in a timely way could be exposed to legal action. 
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The magnitude of the sharp drop in stock price after a profit 
warning can be attributed to many factors such as the business cycle 
during the time at which the profit warning was released (Veronesi, 
1999). This leads to: 
H3: The impact of profit warnings on stock price will be greater 
during periods of economic expansion since negative news is mostly 
unexpected during those times. 
Managers are presented with a disclosure dilemma; should they 
warn investors of the impending surprise prior to the earnings 
announcement or should they keep silent. Skinner (2004) established 
that the likelihood of issuing a warning increases with the size of the 
earning surprise (expectation gap). The larger the impending earning 
surprise, the more quantitative and earning related is the warning. 
Therefore, it appears that the form and the content of the warning are 
chosen by managers to match the seriousness of the expectation gap. It 
is also found that the combined reaction to the warning and the 
subsequent earnings announcement is significantly more negative for 
firms that warned investors than for non warning firms. With that 
being said, it cannot be ruled out that there is a possibility that the 
observed relatively large negative reaction to warnings is also due to 
investors reading into the warnings more than the managers intended. 
Collett (2004) found that management may withhold profit warnings 
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where they desire to conceal increased default risk from creditors and 
where directors hold share interests in the firm. 
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H4: Different industries have different reactions to profit warnings. 
0 'Brian and Hodges ( 1991) found that high technology firms 
appear to be exposed to a larger than average risk of shareholder 
lawsuits, particularly at the early stages of operations, resulting from 
larger price fluctuations and potential losses to investors. Ataise et al. 
(2006) find that litigation risk magnifies the warning effect for bad 
news firms; the warning effect is more negative for high-litigation-risk 
firms than for low-litigation-risk firms . Also, the aggressive 
accounting techniques sometimes used by those firms may contribute 
to litigation exposure. Therefore, high technology firms for example, 
may be motivated to disclose more than firms in other industries to 
fend off investors and litigation. 
Regulated firms such as banks and utility firms provide a large 
amount of operating information to regulators and thereby indirectly to 
the general public. This type of information is often more detailed and 
more timely than the quarterly financial reports. As such it is expected 
that regulated firms have less information asymmetry with investors 
than other firms and engage in a higher level of discretionary 
disclosure. Kasznik and Lev (1995) found that the mean earning 
surprise of the firms with good news is 2.9 per cent of the stock price, 
while the mean surprise of the bad news firms is negative 7.4 per cent. 
The median surprises are smaller than the means, indicating the 
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existence of large positive and negative earnmgs surpnses m their 
sample. 
Krinsky and Lee (1996) investigated the behavior of the 
components of the bid-ask spread around earning announcements and 
found that adverse selection costs increase significantly in the time 
before and after the earnings announcement periods, which they 
considered as evidence of increased information asymmetry. 
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) found that analysts under react to 
negative earning information to the extent that when the analysts under 
react to a profit warning, there is an additional decline in the firms' 
valuation subsequent to the profit warnings. 
Gennotte and Trueman ( 1996) examined the intraday timing of 
corporate announcements, concluding that the impact of a disclosure is 
expected to be stronger if it occurs during trading hours rather than 
after the market closes. 
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Church and Donker (2009) report that firms with multiple 
successive profit warnings show less negative market return if they 
disclose more detailed information, thereby reducing the information 
asymmetry between shareholders and management. Jackson and 
Madura (2007) find that the new regulations on fair disclosure by the 
SEC in 2000 have effectively reduced the leakage of material 
information to favor financial analysts and their clients. Recent 
scandals where managers explicitly withhold negative news from 
investors have shown the necessity of more stringent financial 
regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and RFD. 
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H5: Larger firms have smaller drops in stock prices compared with 
smaller firms. 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) found that firm size is associated 
with the frequency and quality of the corporate disclosure. Therefore, 
due to economies of scale large firms disclose more than small ones. 
Moreover, large firms are more exposed to litigation for having 
"deeper pockets" than small ones, and thus may disclose more to avoid 
litigation or at least to minimize it. Furthermore, Keams and Whitley 
(2002) concluded that profit warnings are associated with a consistent 
decline in shares price which is larger in companies also experiencing 
negative earnings surprises but not issuing profit warnings. 
Management, as a result, will only choose to issue a warning in the 
most dire of circumstances. The extent of leverage increases and 
dividends fall to greater extent in profit warning - issuing firms than in 
those that experience a drop in profits without issuing advance 
wammgs. 
Jackson and Madura (2003) found that firms with large assets 
are especially prone to information leakage despite the surprise 
element within the profit warning. This is seen in the larger drop in 
their stock prices compared with smaller firms in the time of the pre-
profit warnings. They have found that there is little research about 
profit warning, perhaps because warnings were seldom issued until the 
late 1990's. Moreover, the signal conveyed in a profit warning is 
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usually uncertain because the market may have anticipated the 
information from another source and it was disseminated about the 
firm, the industry, or the general economy. Their analysis revealed that 
this effect is more than seven times the typical market response to 
negative earnings announcement in other similar studies. They have 
found that when they combine the results of a four day period, share 
prices of firms that issued profit warnings declined by an average of 
17.1 per cent over a six-day period ending on the date on which the 
warning was announced in the Wall Street Journal. 
The findings of Collett (2004) suggest that for smaller firms, 
there is an overreaction in the market unexpected information. Bulkley 
and Herrierias (2005) observed the same negative abnormal return 
after profit warnings, and further differentiated the results into those 
that only warn of lower than expected profits and those that add a 
revised forecast in addition. In their study, negative market 
performance was greater where the content of the profit warning was 
more vague and imprecise. Kasznik and Lev (1995) and Helbok and 
Walker (2003) both found that the firm's management is more likely 
to issue a warning when the financial problems are of permanent and 
persistent nature. Ifthere is a onetime drop in the firm's earnings, then 
management is much more likely to forego a warning and save the 
news as well as the surprise until the actual earnings announcement. 
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CHAPTER III: 
DATABASE AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the database and methodology used in 
the study. Section 3.1 discusses the database and Section 3. 2 deals 
with the methodology. 
3.1. Collection of Profit Warnings 
The profit warnings for the study were collected for the 1995.to 
2009 period through the Wall Street Journal and other chief daily 
newspapers. Since profit warnings can go by several different names 
in the latest media, several different search terms were used, such as 
"profit warning", "earning adjustments", and "earning warnings."An 
adjustment was made to the date that the profit warning was released; 
before or after "the closing bell" to distinguish between profit 
warnings released prior the opening of the trading hours in the stock 
market and those released after trading hours. 
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3.2. Methodology 
To test if the abnormal returns differ based on the point during 
the business cycle where they occur; the sample of profit warnings was 
divided into a group for each year in the study. Moreover, the sample 
was separated into those warnings that happened during economic 
contraction and those that happened during economic expansion. 
Based on the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER, 201 0) a 
recession is a significant decline in activity spread across the economy, 
lasting more than a few months, visible in industrial production, 
employment, real income, and wholesale-retail trade. Expansion is the 
normal state of the economy. NBER has defined: Expansion 1991 ( 4) 
- 2001 (3); Recession 2001 (4)- 2001 (11); Expansion 2001 (12) -
2007 (12); Recession 2008 (1)- 2009 (6). Thus, in the study there are 
two upward phases, and two downward phases. 
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Table 1: Cumulative Average abnormal Return (CAARs) for 
profit warning issuing firms in economic expansions (N=805) 
(Days before Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) 
and after) (%) 
Event window Market model Market adjusted model 
(-1,+1) -12.67*** -12.62*** 
(-3 ,+3) -13 .95*** -13 .80*** 
(-10,+10) -16.12*** -15.91*** 
(-30,+30) -17 .93*** -17.31 *** 
(-30,-1) -7.36*** -6.92*** 
(+ 1,+30) -0.65 -0.44 
*** 
** 
* 
Indicates significance at the 0.001 level. 
Indicates significance at the 0.01 level. 
Indicates significance at the 0.05 level. 
Table 2: CAARs for profit warning issuing firms in recession 
periods (N=258) 
Event window Market model Market adjusted model 
(-1 ,+1) -9.72*** -1 0.02*** 
(-3,+3) -1 0.49*** -1 0.66*** 
(-10,+10) -11.44*** -11.30*** 
(-30,+30) -15.00*** -14.38*** 
(-30,-1) -7.23*** -8.36*** 
(+ 1,+30) 0.44 2.44* 
Note: Same has in Table I. 
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An event study methodology was used to analyze the effect of 
profit warning on stock prices (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985; 
Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997; Mills et al., 1996 and Mishra 
et al., 2007). The daily stock price data pre and post profit warning 
date was collected from Datastream database for most, but not all, 
profit warnings. The collection of stock price data was automated 
through use of EventStream software, and the abnormal returns were 
calculated through Eventus software (Cowan, 2009). The abnormal 
returns for the profit warnings from each firm were calculated using 
both the market model and the market adjusted model (equation 3 and 
4), based on a value-weighted total-market index from Datastream. An 
event window of 30 days before and 30 days after the day of the profit 
warning was used for this event study. The pre-estimation period for 
the event study was 240 days prior to the event date, equivalent to 
approximately one year of trading. The case for event studies has been 
made by Brown and Warner (1985), and this technique is widely used 
in the empirical investigations (Kothari and Warner, 2005). 
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Based on the framework of Brown and Warner (1980) and 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), let t=O represent the time period 
t relative to the profit warning event and actual return (Rit) is: 
Rit = Kit+ Eit (1) 
Where Kit is the "normal" (i.e., expected or predicted return of a 
particular model) and Eit is the component of the return which is 
abnormal or unexpected. Thus the abnormal return (AR) is the 
difference between the observed return and the predicted return: 
Eit = Rit - Kit (2) 
In the econometric investigation, a model of normal returns (i.e., 
expected returns unconditional on the event but conditional on other 
information) needs to be specified. For this purpose the market model 
(MM) and market adjusted model (MAM) were used and are given in 
equation (3) and ( 4) 
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Market Model: 
Market-Adjusted Model: 
ARj ,t = Ri,t- Rm,t (4) 
Where Rm, t is the market return for day t. Although, calculations for 
both market and market adjusted models were done, the empirical 
analysis is mainly based on market model. We found no significant 
difference between the market model and the market adjusted model in 
our empirical results. 
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CHAPTER IV: 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents the empirical results and is arranged as 
follows: Section 4.lpresents descriptive statistics, Section 4.2 presents 
estimates of CAARs according to phases of business cycles, 
Section4.3 presents estimates of CAARs according to industry and 
Section4.4 presents estimates of CAARs according to firm size. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1: CAARs diagram for market model and market adjusted 
model 
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The empirical results reveal an immediate decline of 11.9 per cent one 
day before and one day after the issue of the profit warning followed 
by further decline of the average return of up to 17.2 per cent overall 
in the event window of 30 days before and 30 days after the release of 
the profit warning. This data is significant across all firms in the 
sample across business cycles as well as with respect to the size of the 
firms. As such, the results support and validate the hypothesis that 
issuing a profit warning leads to a negative abnormal return for the 
shares of the issuing firm. 
To test if abnormal returns differ from year to year m the 
business cycle where they occur, the sample was divided to profit 
warnings for each year in our study. Figure 2 presents the number of 
profit warnings during the period 1995-2009. As it is evident from 
figure 2, the numbers of profit warnings were highest during 2001. 
Since 2002 the number has been a moderated, reflecting new 
regulation (SOX). Then the abnormal returns were calculated with the 
market model and market adjusted model for each year and are plotted 
in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2: U.S. profit warnings and trends in S&P 500 Index (year-
end close)- 1995-2009 
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Figure 3: CAARs of Profit Warning Firms in U.S.-1995-2009 
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4.2 Estimates of CAARs according to phases of business cycles. 
During econormc expansiOn periods, investors will become 
more confident that the market is in a good condition. On the other 
hand, when bad news is released it causes market prices to fall, since 
bad news lowers the perception of investors that the market is in a 
good state. Furthermore, as uncertainty in the real state of the economy 
grows, investors who are risk-averse require a higher return. The 
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overall uncertainty about the condition of the economy results m 
asymmetry in the response for bad news. 
Table 3: CAARs of Profit Warnings According to Business Cycles-
1995-2009 
Periods 
Event Window 
-1+1 -3+3 -5+5 -10+10 -20+20 -30+30 
1995(1 )-
-0.1518 -0.1679 -0.1769 -0.1927 -0.1925 -0.1999 
2001(2) 
2001 (3)-
-0.1014 -0.1126 -0.1175 -0.1259 -0.1463 -0.1890 
2001(11) 
2002(12)-
-0.1013 -0.1106 -0.1191 -0.1292 -0.1430 -0.1586 
2007(12) 
2008(1)-
-0.0805 -0.0770 -0.0696 -0.0737 -0.0513 -0.0133 
2009(6) 
The empirical results based on equation 3 in chapter III 
presented in the table above. The average CAARs during the event 
window ( -1, + 1) shows that the negative abnormal returns were 
relatively higher during the economic expansion periods (negative 
15.2 per cent and 10.1 per cent respectively ) compared with the 
average CAARs during economic contraction periods (1 0.1 per cent 
and 8.0 per cent respectively). These results generally support 
hypothesis 2 thus making it valid as the magnitude of profit warnings 
vary according to the phase of the business cycle. 
Moreover, it validates the results of hypothesis 3 by proving 
significantly that the impact on stock price is greater during periods of 
economic expansion in view of the fact that negative news is mostly 
unexpected during those times. 
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Figure 4: CAARs of U.S. Firms According to Business Cycles 
Period 
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Xu (2008) suggests that the negative market reactions to 
warning firms are a demonstration of the investors' over reaction. The 
fact that good (bad) news is followed by positive (negative) returns is 
referred to as the post earnings announcement drift. Conrad et al. 
(2002) suggest that there are systematic shifts in investor sentiment 
that are common across stocks; specifically, during good times, 
investor confidence rises and investors extrapolate the good news for 
firms. He finds support for the hypothesis that stock prices respond 
most strongly to bad news in good times. In particular, the stock price 
response to negative earnings surprises is increasing as the market 
level rises. On the other hand, firms providing specific information 
that the extrapolation of good news is not applicable to them are 
severely punished. During bad times, the opposite reaction happens. 
Veronesi (2002) shows that international markets tend to be more 
correlated when the countries are m a recess10nary state 
simultaneously. Good news during bad times are more likely to be 
interpreted as a switch back to high state compared to bad news during 
good times which is interpreted as a switch to a low state. 
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4.3 Estimates ofCAARs according to industry 
For the purpose of this study the total sample was divided into 
two classifications: one group included all the firms that are 
Manufacturing and Services firms (Non ICT) and the other group 
included all the companies that are Information, Technology and 
Communication (ICT). In order to provide a sufficient sample the Non 
ICT sample for the base firms included 624 different CAARs and the 
ICT base firms included 438 different CAARs. The average CAARs 
were calculated for the different event windows. The results were 
significantly different for each year with an average of negative 5.4 per 
cent for the Manufacturing and Services firms and with a negative 8.1 
per cent for the ICT firms. There is a strong positive correlation 
between the different industry classifications, this validates hypothesis 
4 by presenting that the Manufacturing and Services firms have less 
impact on the price share when issuing a profit warning. On the other 
hand, ICT firms are exposed to more risk and are more volatile, and as 
such reflect an additional 3 per cent in the drop of their price shares 
when reporting a profit warning. 
Furthermore, an analysis of Peer firms was conducted to find 
correlation between the Base firms and the Peer firms that did not 
report profit warnings . The results were significant with negative 6.7 
per cent for the Non ICT firms (n=509) and negative 13.8 per cent for 
the ICT firms (n=656). The results reflect a strong positive correlation 
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between the Base and the Peer firms for both ICT and Non ICT firms. 
This further validates Hypothesis 4. Below are 2 Tables: Table 4 
presented the Average CAARS of ICT and Non ICT U.S Firms and 
Table 5 presents the Average CAARs of Peers ICT and Non ICT U.S 
Firms: 
Table 4: Average CAARs ofiCT and Non ICT U.S. Firms 
Non ICT ICT 
Event Window 
N=656 N=438 
-30-30 -0.0006 -0.0043 
-29-29 -0.0026 -0.0029 
-28 -28 -0.0011 -0.0032 
-30-1 -0.0547 -0.1012 
-20-1 -0.0432 -0.0781 
-10-1 -0.0355 -0.0532 
-5-1 -0.0262 -0.0373 
-1 + 1 -0.1043 -0.1412 
-3+3 -0.1170 -0.1513 
-5+5 -0.1210 -0.1629 
-10+10 -0.1286 -0.1804 
-20+20 -0.1266 -0.2022 
-30+30 -0.1357 -0.2251 
+1+5 -0.0140 -0.0101 
+1+10 -0.0121 -0.0117 
+1+20 -0.0025 -0.0086 
+1+30 -0.0001 -0.0084 
Total Average -0.0545 -0.0813 
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Table 5: Average CAARs of Peers ICT & Non ICT U.S. Firms 
Average CAARs (Non ICT) 
Manufacturing and Services 
Peers Firms 
Average CAARs 
ICT PEERS 
(n=509) 
Average CAARs 
-0.0672 
(n=656) 
Average CAARs 
-0.1383 
The results validating hypothesis 4 are clearly presented in the 
figure 5 below. The average CAARs for ICT firms is much larger than 
the average CAARs for Non ICT firms. As predicted, since ICT firms 
are exposed to more risk on average than that of Non ICT firms larger 
price fluctuations are expected and therefore a higher potential risk of 
losses for investors exists. That should encourage high tech firms to 
disclose more information so as to insure a higher transparency of 
information. This, together with information flow, will help to reduce 
the asymmetry in the market. 
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Figure 5: Average CAARs ofiCT &Non ICT U.S Firms 
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4.4 Estimates of CAARs according to firm size 
In order to classify the different firms' sizes, the firms were 
divided according to their total assets. 351 firms were classified as 
small firms with total asset of up to $1.13B, another 350 firms were 
classified as medium firms with total assets from $1.13B to $8.8B. The 
last 360 firms were classified as large firms with total assets from 
$8.88B to $143B. The total average debt for each classification as 
been tabulated as well as the average CAARs and the firms' leverages. 
Table 6: Classification of Firms According to Size (in millions) 
Sample Size 
Average 
Leverage 
Size (Total 
Total Debt 
CAARs Assets) 
N=351 (Small) -0.1023 49.81 % $ 1,131.9 $ 563 .8 
N=350 (Medium) -0.0557 56.49% $ 8,870.2 $ 5,011.0 
N=360 (Large) -0.0417 66.15% $ 143,367.4 $ 94,838.2 
Note: Small refers to firms w1th total assets less than $1.13 billion; Medmm refers to 
firms with total assets over $1.13 billion and $8.8 billion. Large refer to firms with 
total assets over $8.8 billion and up to $143 billion. 
As can be clearly seen from the above table, the larger the firm 
in terms of total assets on average the larger the debt it carries and the 
risk element is just as high. Furthermore, smaller firms on average 
have less than 50 per cent leverage while larger firms have over 66 per 
cent leverage. On the other hand, the average CAARs is smaller for the 
larger firm than the average CAARs for the smaller ones. Larger firms 
are usually more exposed to regulations and corporate disclosure. They 
are also exposed to more litigation and therefore are more transparent. 
31 
As a result, the larger the firm the smaller the CAARs 
Figure 6: Firm Size Leverage and CAARs 
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The average CAARs for a small size firmis negative 10.2 per 
cent whereas the average CAARs for a large firm is negative 4.1 per 
cent. These results validate the hypothesis by providing evidence that 
on average, larger size firms have smaller drop in stock prices. 
According to the findings of Jackson and Madura (2003), large asset 
firms are prone to information leakage more than the small or the 
medium firms. As such, the information is disseminated to the market 
and the surprise affect is smaller. 
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CHAPTERV: 
CONCLUSIONS 
We find that profit warnings lead to a sharp and immediate 
decline in stock market returns, with cumulative average abnormal 
returns for our sample of negative 13.95 per cent for the (-3,+3) event 
window, and negative 17.22 per cent for the (-30,+30) event window 
(both using the market model). These findings are very similar for both 
the market model and the market adjusted model and consistent with 
other studies in the field (Jackson and Madura, 2003; Bulkley and 
Herrerias, 2005). This study examines whether investors overreact to 
bad news during good times and under-react to bad news during 
economic downturns. We examine the investor's overreaction and 
under-reaction to bad news during business cycles. We find that the 
immediate price reaction to a firm's profit warning (bad news) is much 
stronger during periods of economic expansion than during periods of 
economic contraction. Firms that issue bad news during good times are 
severely punished by investors relatively to firms that release negative 
news during bad times. 
Different firms have different reactions to profit warning based 
on the sector within which they operate. The size of the firm is a 
measurement to consider when predicting the behavior of a share price 
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for a firm, as well as the other not reporting peers, which are positively 
correlated. 
The study of the stock market's reaction to profit warnings is 
as much as a study of psychology as finance. Libby and Tan (1999) 
experimentally determined that the sequential processing of profit 
warning followed by the actual negative earnings announcement leads 
analysts to issue much lower future earning guidance, compared with 
disappointing earnings announcements on their own. They also 
examined the analyst's reactions to forecasts of adverse earnings in an 
attempt to reconcile negative forecasts revisions with apparently 
conflicting evidence that suggests there are more positive responses to 
firms that issue warnings. They found that analysts revise future 
earnings projections to incorporate earnings warnings. These findings 
imply that the warnings provide valuable information that was not 
already processed by the analysts. Managers, due to a range of 
incentives, including career concerns, will choose to withhold bad 
news up to a certain point and alternatively reveal good news to 
investors as soon as possible. As a result, the magnitude of the 
negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures is greater than 
that of the positive reaction to good news. The tendency to withhold 
bad news stems from a standard agency problem where no alignment 
exists between managerial disclosure and shareholder preferences. The 
managers possess superior private information relative to the 
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investment community. Managerial commitment to quickly disclose 
private information can reduce information asymmetry and potentially 
lower the firms' cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991 ). 
Many reasons create different incentives to release good news versus 
bad news to investors. For example, litigation can motivate managers 
to quickly reveal bad news (Kasznik and Lev [1995], Skinner [1994, 
1997]. They may also wish to increase their value of their options and 
stocks. This in general contributes to the magnitude of market 
reactions and expectations to the lack of information in the stock 
market. Holding bad news has an effect on the true value of the firm 
and prevents investors from making an informed decision about 
investing in the firm. Overall, it adds to the inefficiency of the market. 
The decision to issue a profit warning ultimately rests with the 
individual firm's officers, who know about profit warnings and related 
announcements that negatively influence the share prices of the firm in 
the short term. Diamond and Verrecchia ( 1991) and Boston ( 1997) 
have found that a greater degree of disclosure generally decreases the 
cost of equity capital and this therefore, increases the firm profitability. 
The study also examined the industry wise differences in 
CAARs. The study found that the average CAARs of ICT firms is 
much larger than the average CAARs on Non-ICT firms. This can be 
explained in terms of grater market risk of ICT firms compared with 
Non-ICT firms. 
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As regards to the relationship between the size of the firm and 
CAARs, the study found that smaller firms have larger average 
CAARs compared with medium and larger firms . Larger firms are 
usually more exposed to regulations and corporate disclosure. They are 
also exposed to more litigation and therefore are more transparent. As 
a result, the larger the firms are the smaller the CAARs. 
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